The Impact of Judicial Review on the Department of Veterans Affairs\u27 Claims Adjudication Process: The Changing Role of the Board of Veterans\u27 Appeals by Craigin, Charles L.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 46 
Number 1 Veterans Law Symposium Article 4 
January 1994 
The Impact of Judicial Review on the Department of Veterans 
Affairs' Claims Adjudication Process: The Changing Role of the 
Board of Veterans' Appeals 
Charles L. Craigin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the 
President/Executive Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles L. Craigin, The Impact of Judicial Review on the Department of Veterans Affairs' Claims 
Adjudication Process: The Changing Role of the Board of Veterans' Appeals, 46 Me. L. Rev. 23 (1994). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol46/iss1/4 
This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON
THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS' CLAIMS ADJUDICATION
PROCESS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE
BOARD OF VETERANS' APPEALS
Charles L. Cragin, Chairman, Board of Veterans' Appeals'
In a March 1992 statement submitted to the Congress, the Deputy
Secretary of Veterans Affairs described the impact of judicial review
on the Department of Veterans Affairs (Department or VA) as
"profound."'2 That description is still apt and applies with as much
force to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board or BVA) as it does
to the Department as a whole. Nothing has had as much impact on
the Board as the Veterans' Judicial Review Act (VJRA).3 The VJRA
established the United States Court of Veterans Appeals in 1988
and charged it with the review of decisions of the Board.4 Prior to
the VJRA, decisions of the Board were not subject to judicial review,
except in very limited circumstances. Judicial review has provided a
convenient forum for testing the validity of departmental regula-
tions and settling some long-disputed points of veterans law. It has
also helped in establishing a more systematic approach to benefit
claims adjudication and in providing a forum for dispute resolution
outside the Department to veterans who may feel that VA has not
treated them fairly. Nevertheless, these benefits have not been
achieved without costs, particularly in increased formality and com-
plexity of the adjudication process and a considerable expansion of
the time necessary to render a final decision in a claim.
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
The Board celebrates its sixtieth anniversary this year.5 The first
1. I wish to express my appreciation to Steven L. Keller, Esq., Counsel to the
Chairman, Board of Veterans' Appeals, Connie Haskins, Esq., Staff Counsel in the
Office of Counsel to the Chairman, Board of Veterans' Appeals, and Clay Witt, Esq.,
Director, Legal Policy and Planning, Board of Veterans' Appeals, for their invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this article.
2. Department of Veterans Affairs' Implementation of U.S. Court of Veterans
Appeals Decisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Compensation, Pension and
Insurance of the Senate Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Seas. 34 (1992)
(statement of Anthony J. Principi, Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs).
3. Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
4. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251-7252 (Supp. M 1991).
5. The Board was created by Executive Order during the early years of Franklin
D. Roosevelt's administration. For a history of the development of appellate bodies in
the field of veterans law in the United States, see US. DEPAr am OF VnmnAS
AFFAits. PAMPHLET No. 1-3. BOARD OF VETERAxs' APsALS 5DH ANNimESARY PAm-
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half-century of the Board's existence was a period of incremental,
rather than revolutionary, changes. The Board was a part of a fed-
eral system for compensating former members of the United States
armed forces for disabilities sustained in service, a system that was
marked by what Justice Rehnquist has referred to as "rational pa-
ternalism."' The hallmark of the system was its informal and
nonadversarial nature.
A significant feature of that nonadversarial process was that,
while a VA claimant was free to submit expert opinion evidence in
support of his or her claim, he or she was not required to do so to
establish entitlement to the benefit or benefits sought. Rather, the
VA system relied on the expertise of its adjudicators for the proper
assessment and evaluation of claims for veterans' benefits. For ex-
ample, initial decisions on disability claims were made at the local
level by a three-person "rating board." This board consisted of a
medical specialist, a legal specialist, and an occupational specialist.7
These individuals utilized their expertise to evaluate claims, rather
than rely exclusively on a detached evaluation of any expert opinion
contained in the record. They were required to resolve all "reasona-
ble doubt" in the claimant's favor.8 They were "to assist [the] claim-
ant in developing the facts pertinent to the claim and to render a
decision which grants him every benefit that can be supported in
law while protecting the interests of the Government.""
The Board of Veterans' Appeals used a similar approach. Then, as
now, decisions by the Board were made by a three-member Board
"section. ' '1 Prior to judicial review, each section of the Board that
considered disability matters consisted of two attorneys and a li-
censed physician. These Board members were charged to grant ben-
PHLET (1984). The Board is currently a statutory body. See 38 U.S.C. § 7101 (Supp.
III 1991).
6. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323 (1985).
This opinion gives an excellent overview of the veterans' benefits system as it existed
prior to the passage of the VJRA. This paternalistic concern for veterans goes back to
the founding days of the country. "If 'paternalism' is an insignificant Government
interest, then Congress first went astray in 1792 . . . ." Id. The Court went on to
conclude that the governmental interest was not insignificant. Id.
7. Id. at 309.
8. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1988).
9. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1988). These regulatory principles of resolving doubt in
a claimant's favor and assisting in the development of claims were made statutory by
the VJRA. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (Supp. III 1991).
10. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4002, 4003 (1988); 38 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 7103 (Supp. III 1991).
Sections contained within title 38 of the United States Code, the title containing stat-
utory provisions relating to veterans' benefits, were renumbered in 1991. See Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs Health-Care Personnel Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-40,
§ 402, 105 Stat. 187, 238 (1991); Department of Veterans Affairs Codification Act,
Pub. L. No. 102-83, 105 Stat. 378 (1991). The same sections of the code appear with
different numbers, depending on the year.
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efits in each case in which it was legally and medically warranted.
They were (and continue to be) required to consider all evidence of
record,1 but, in practice, they were expected to use the additional
resources provided by their own training and their informed legal
and medical judgment, gained through years of practical experience
in the adjudication of such claims. 2
This approach does not lend itself to review in an adversarial judi-
cial arena. In the adversarial context, judges decide cases solely on
the record before them. In fact, the United States Court of Veterans
Appeals is expressly required to do so.13 Prior to the enactment of
the VJRA, Board decisions increasingly reflected an attempt to im-
prove decisional quality by providing a more detailed articulation of
the rationale for the decision. A typical BVA decision had grown
from a one-page document tersely allowing or denying appeals to a
five- or six-page document describing the contentions raised, the ev-
idence of record, the applicable statutory and regulatory authorities,
and the reasons why the claim was allowed or denied. Nevertheless,
prior to the VJRA, the explanation usually was neither detailed nor
highly technical. For example, in response to questions such as
whether a current disability was etiologically related to another con-
dition that was present in service, the Board would sometimes just
cite "sound medical principles" for its conclusion. In part, this ap-
proach reflected the belief that detailed technical medical explana-
tions were not of interest to the average lay person. Also in keeping
with the non-adversarial nature of the adjudication process, the
Board generally refrained from commenting on "sensitive" matters
such as the credibility, or lack thereof, of some statements and testi-
mony received in support of a claim. Perhaps the most significant
motivation for providing a truncated explanation for the basis of a
decision was the necessity of processing an enormous caseload in a
timely manner with limited resources.1 ' As discussed below, improv-
ing decision quality, productivity, and timeliness, despite a heavy
workload, remain paramount concerns for the Board.
The VJRA, for the first time, required the Board to include "the
reasons or bases for [its] findings and conclusions . . . ." Previ-
ously, the Board had been required to include only "findings of fact
11. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 4005(d)(5) (West 1979), superseded by 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a)
(Supp. 11 1991).
12. For a fuller treatment of this approach and its history, see Charles L. Cragin,
A Time of Transition at the Board of Veterans' Appeals: The Changing Role of the
Physician, 38 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 500 (1991).
13. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b) (Supp. M 1991).
14. In fiscal year 1988, the last full fiscal year before the VJRA became law, the
Board received 43,792 appeals and disposed of 41,607 cases. Internal Records of the
Board (on file with author). These records are required by 38 U.S.C. § 7101(d) (Supp.
m1 1991).
15. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1991).
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and conclusions of law separately stated" in its decisions.16 The ra-
tionale for this change, as contained in the legislative history of the
VJRA, was rearticulated by the court in one of its early landmark
decisions:
One reason given for this change, which was adopted in the final
version of the VJRA, was to provide "a decisional document from
the Board that will enable a claimant to understand, not only the
Board's decision but also the precise basis for that decision, and
[will] also permit a claimant to understand the Board's response to
the various arguments advanced by the claimant." S. Rep. No. 418,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1988). Moreover, the Committee provided
another explanation for the change: "[Tihe decisional document
should assist the reviewing court to understand and evaluate the
VA adjudication action."'
This rationale was particularly applicable to the evaluation of
medical issues. The court concluded in one of its early opinions that:
BVA decisions must include the "reasons or bases" for medical
conclusions, even those opined by a BVA physician; a mere state-
ment of an opinion, without more, does not provide an opportunity
for the veteran to explore a basis for reconsideration or for this
Court to review the BVA decision "on the record" as required by
38 U.S.C. § 4052(b).18
Then, in Colvin v. Derwinski,19 the court stated that "BVA panels
may consider only independent medical evidence to support their
findings."20 This line of cases effectively ended the "panel of ex-
perts" approach that had characterized the VA adjudication system
since its inception.2 After the terms of current physician members
expire in July 1994, the Board will continue to utilize the services of
its physicians as teachers and advisors, but not as adjudicators.
IMPACT ON THE NONADVERSARIAL PROCESS
The VJRA brought about numerous changes, but its two principal
features are the establishment of judicial review of the Board's deci-
sions and the elimination of a Civil War era $10.00 fee limitation
that had the effect of keeping involvement of attorneys in veterans'
benefits cases to a minimum.22 VA long opposed both changes. VA's
16. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4004(d) (West 1979).
17. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 56 (1990) (quoting S. Rep. No. 418, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1988) (emphasis added)).
18. Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990).
19. 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991).
20. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
21. BOARD OF VETERANS' APPEALS, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRs, ANN. REP. OF
THE CHAIRMAN, 5 (1992) [hereinafter CHAIRMAN'S ANN. REP. (1992)]. In my 1992 An-
nual Report, I reiterated that I do not intend to make any further recommendations
to the Secretary for the appointment of physicians as members of the Board.
22. The $10.00 fee limitation, previously found at 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c), is the prin-
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most frequently voiced concern was that these measures would im-
pair its long-standing, supportive, nonadversarial role in its relation-
ship with veterans. A remark by VA's General Counsel at a 1986
Congressional hearing is typical. "Enactment of judicial review
would interject an adversary relationship into what has been a coop-
erative process. As a matter of principle, VA should never be placed
in an adversary position, much less become an opposing litigant,
with respect to claimants. '23 In the same statement,24 the General
Counsel quoted this excerpt from Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors:2
Knowledgeable and thoughtful observers have made the same
point in other language:
"To be sure, counsel can often perform useful functions even in
welfare cases or other instances of mass justice; they may bring out
facts ignored by or unknown to the authorities, or help to work out
satisfactory compromises. But this is only one side of the coin.
Under our adversary system the role of counsel is not to make sure
the truth is ascertained but to advance his client's cause by any
ethical means. Within the limits of professional propriety, causing
delay and sowing confusion not only are his right but may be his
duty. The appearance of counsel for the citizen is likely to lead the
government to provide one-or at least to cause the government's
representative to act like one. The result may be to turn what
might have been a short conference leading to an amicable result
into a protracted controversy. 26
As the fifth anniversary of the passage of the VJRA nears, the
specter of litigious, overzealous counsel has not yet materialized as a
serious or systemic problem. Thus far, the private bar as a whole
seems to have shown relatively little interest in the practice of veter-
ans law. In fiscal year 1988, attorneys served as the representative in
669 cases disposed of by the Board. This constituted 1.6% of the
cipal focus of Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
That opinion includes an excellent discussion of the history of this provision and its
governmental purposes. Although the $10.00 limitation was removed by the VJRA,
there are still restrictions on fees. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904 (Supp. HI 1991); 38 C.F.R.
§ 20.609 (1992).
23. H.R. 585 and Other Bills Relating to Judicial Rjuiew of Veterans' Claims:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 221
(volI) (1986) (statement of Donald L. Ivers, General Counsel, Veterans
Administration).
24. Id. at 223-24.
25. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
26. Id. at 325-26 (quoting Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U PA. L Rav.
1267, 1287-90 (1975)). Similar objections were raised to the bills that eventually
evolved into the VJRA. See Judicial Review Legislation: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 490 (1988) (statement of Donald
L. Ivers, General Counsel, Veterans Administration); Judicial Review of Veterans'
Affairs: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Ses.
446 (1988) (statement of Donald L. Ivers, General Counsel, Veterans Administration).
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cases decided by the Board during that period. These figures were
typical until fiscal year 1992, when attorneys served as the represen-
tative in 763 cases, or 2.3% of the cases disposed of by the Board.
The figures for the first three quarters of fiscal year 1993 are 541
cases and 2.7%, respectively. Thus the impact of attorney represen-
tation before the Department has been relatively slight.27
Financial disincentives probably remain the most significant fac-
tor contributing to the relatively low level of attorney involvement.
First, fees may not be charged for work performed at the early
stages of representation before the Department. With certain very
limited exceptions, attorneys may not charge fees "with respect to
services provided before the date on which the Board of Veterans'
Appeals first makes a final decision in the case. s28 Thus, although
attorneys may become involved early on in a claim to "build the
record," they must work without charge until there has been an ini-
tial denial by the Board, and the time has arrived for filing a motion
for administrative reconsideration, a reopened administrative claim,
or a judicial appeal.
Second, increases in disability compensation awards in VA benefit
cases are often small and therefore yield only modest attorney fees,
especially in the typical situation where the attorney charges a con-
tingency fee based on a percentage of the amount of an award of
accrued, past-due benefits. Unlike Social Security disability cases,
most VA disability compensation claims do not involve awards
based on total disability. Rather, VA disability compensation is
awarded on a graduated scale, based on the degree of impairment
shown. The degree of disability is calculated in 10% increments.Y°
The largest group of current disability awards is in the 10%
category. 0
27. These figures do not include cases in which the representative was Vietnam
Veterans of America, a veterans' service organization that often uses the services of
attorneys and law students in appellate representation before the Board. This organi-
zation usually serves as the representative in less than one-half of one percent of the
cases before the Board. Internal Records of the Board (on file with author). The
statistics for fiscal year 1992 can be found in the CHAIRMAN'S ANN. REP. (1992), supra
note 21. The figures for fiscal year 1993 have not yet been published but will be avail-
able in the CHAIRMAN'S ANN. REP. (1993).
28. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (Supp. I 1991). The same limitations apply to fees
charged by "agents," i.e., non-attorney claims agents who have met the VA's accredi-
tation standards. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 14.629(b), 20.3(b) (1992). There are very few of
these agents. Fees may not be charged by service organization employees who act as
representatives or by individuals recognized as representatives with respect to a par-
ticular claim, typically a family member or friend who represents an individual appel-
lant. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5902, 5903 (Supp. III 1991).
29. See 38 C.F.R. pt. 4 (1992).
30. At the end of fiscal year 1992, the number of veterans assigned disability rat-
ings totalled 2,180,936. Of these, 871,467 were at the 10% level. Only 132,078 were at
the 100% level. U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANs AFFAIRs, ANN. REP. OF THE SECRErARY OF
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Another significant factor minimizing private attorney participa-
tion is that national and state veterans' service organizations re-
present veterans and their dependents without charge. These orga-
nizations historically have provided most of the representational
services for claimants in the VA adjudication system and, given
their depth of experience, often have a degree of subject matter ex-
pertise that exceeds that of many private attorneys who are still un-
familiar with this area of practice. The service organizations con-
tinue to provide representation for most appellants before the
Board.3 '
Recent changes in the law may promote greater attorney involve-
ment in administrative adjudication. In the Federal Courts Adminis-
tration Act of 1992,32 Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2) (F)
to include the United States Court of Veterans Appeals within the
definition of courts authorized to make fee awards under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA).33 Although EAJA fees are awarded for
representation before the court, the fact that such fees are based on
factors independent of the amount recovered by the client provides
some incentive for attorney involvement earlier in the development
of the case at the administrative level. In one case recently argued
before the court, an issue was raised as to whether an EAJA award
is recoverable for attorney services rendered in a case after the court
has remanded that case to the Board.3 4 If the court decides that is-
sue in the affirmative, an additional incentive for attorney represen-
tation would result.
Another incentive for involvement of the private bar was high-
lighted by a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. In Gardner v. Brown,35 the court held that a
VA regulation impermissibly imposed a fault or accident require-
ment for benefits awarded under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (formerly section
VaTERAis AFFAiRs, 79, 81 (1992) [hereinafter SEcRErARY's ANN. REp. (1992)]. Mone-
tary amounts for each rate are set by statute. See 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. 1I 1991).
Since these rates are usually adjusted annually, the rates in published versions of the
code are frequently somewhat less than the current actual rate. As an example, the
10% and 100% rates were respectively $83 and $1,680 monthly, effective December 1,
1991. Veterans' Compensation Rate Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-152, 105
Stat. 985 (1991). These rates were raised by the same percentage and at the same
time as the December 1, 1992, increase in Social Security benefits. Veterans' Compen-
sation Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-510, § 2, 106 Stat.
3318 (1992).
31. For the first three quarters of fiscal year 1993, these organizations provided
representation in approximately 87% of the cases decided by the Board. Internal
Records of the Board (on file with author).
32. Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992).
33. Id. § 506, 106 Stat. at 4513.
34. Moore v. Brown, U.S. Vet. App. No. 89-79. This case is currently pending
before the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals.
35. 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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351).36 That statute provides for compensation for additional disa-
bility incurred or aggravated as the result of VA medical treat-
ment.37 The invalidation of this regulation, which had been in effect
for nearly sixty years, essentially converted a fault-based compensa-
tion scheme into a no-fault system. Clearly, Gardner will have sub-
stantial prospective financial impact on both the VA compensation
and health care systems. In addition, the decision calls into question
nearly sixty years of VA administrative adjudications of entitlement
to benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1151. If the court determines that
many of these prior decisions contain "clear and unmistakable" er-
ror under section 3.105 of title 38 of the Code of Federal Regulations
because they were based on an invalid regulation, the possibility of a
contingency fee based on a percentage of a large award of past-due
accrued benefits may spur increased attorney involvement.
In contrast to the approach the Board has historically taken, the
adversarial system is the standard operating procedure for the
United States Court of Veterans Appeals, which, in this sense, oper-
ates similarly to any other federal appellate court. The VA claimant,
usually appearing pro se,3 8 but sometimes represented by a private
attorney, or by a service organization attorney or non-attorney prac-
titioner, is on one side and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, repre-
sented by the Department's General Counsel,39 is on the other.
Tension inevitably arises between VA's nonadversarial adjudica-
tion system and the adversarial arena in which the decisions of that
system are reviewed. The Board renders the final decision for the
Secretary on nearly all benefits entitlement issues.40 The court re-
views decisions of the Board. As a direct result, the Board literally is
the area of interface between the adversarial judicial system and the
nonadversarial VA benefits system. VA was created in response to
the great moral debt the nation owes to its veterans. The Board is
charged with providing veterans and their dependents with a fair,
high-quality decision in a timely manner.41 At the same time, Board
decisions must comport with all the requirements of the law, as ar-
ticulated by the court. While relatively few decisions of the Board
actually come before the court, all BVA decisions must be prepared
to withstand the scrutiny of judicial review. Preparation of cases ac-
cording to these standards, which include all notice and due process
procedures, has increased the length and complexity of BVA deci-
36. Id. at 1463-64.
37. 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. III 1991).
38. Recent statistics from the court reflect that, as of July 31, 1993, 82.8% of ap-
pellants in 1993 appeared before the court pro se. UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS
APPEALS, CASEFLOW REPORT (July 31, 1993).
39. 38 U.S.C. § 7263(a) (Supp. III 1991).
40. Id. § 7104(a).
41. By statute, the Board is charged "to conduct hearings and consider and dis-
pose of appeals properly before [it] in a timely manner." Id. § 7101(a).
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sions, added a legalistic and adversarial tone to the decision making
process, and dramatically increased the time it takes the Board to
issue a decision.
One of the clearest examples of the kind of conflict that can now
arise between the adversarial and nonadversarial processes is in the
duty to weigh the credibility and probative value of lay statements
and testimony. The nonadversarial approach, as it was historically
applied at the Board, would favor a deferential or indirect approach
to unreliable evidence, especially when it appears to be a product of
fading memory or a well-meaning effort by a friend or relative to be
supportive.42 The Board would include little or nothing about such
evidence in the decision, assign it little or no weight, and support
the decision by citing evidence with greater probative
value-particularly documents prepared proximate in time to the
actual occurrence of the significant events. The credibility of an affi-
ant or witness was directly attacked only in the most egregious
circumstances.
This "deferential" approach is inconsistent with the adversarial
nature of judicial review. In order to determine whether the Board
has decided a matter correctly, the court must be informed, on the
record, of the "reasons or bases" for the decision. The court has
made it clear that the Board must candidly discuss the weight given
to lay statements and testimony in its decisions. For example, Jones
v. Derwinski'3 included this language:
However, the majority here is of the view that the assessment of
the credibility of the veteran's sworn testimony is a function for
the BVA in the first instance and that it is not for this Court to
find . . . that sworn testimony, under the circumstances of this
case, is credible. That issue will thus be remanded to the Board
with a direction to make a specific determination as to the credibil-
ity of the veteran's testimony and to provide a statement of the
reasons or bases for that determination."
The Board must be candid in its decisions in order to withstand
judicial review. Such candor, especially on matters of credibility, ap-
pears inconsistent with the nonadversarial atmosphere that had his-
torically characterized proceedings before VA.
Another source of tension arises from the juxtaposition of the
more formal and legalistic approach required in the post-judicial re-
view era with the traditional nonadversarial approach to entitle-
42. Certainly, the majority of veterans present their cases as honestly as they can.
In some cases, it may become apparent to the finder of fact that recitations of events
have been embroidered and expanded, that accurate memory of the events described
has faded in time, or that descriptions of the events are not based on first-hand infor-
mation. In a few instances, statements and testimony are simply not truthful.
43. 1 Vet. App. 210 (1991).
44. Id. at 217.
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ments adjudication. An example will illustrate the point. A generally
accepted principle of law is that there is a point at which there is an
end to litigation and that the same questions may not be endlessly
contested. The doctrine of res judicata is an example. Although the
standards are much less strict in VA claims adjudication than in
many other areas of the law, this principle is recognized in statutes
and regulations that raise obstacles to gaining VA benefits once a
claim has been finally denied." As part of the traditional paternalis-
tic outlook, some Board members of the old school were reluctant to
deny an appeal based on the finality of an earlier adverse decision.
They might simply ignore the prior final denial, or give it cursory
treatment, and then go on to deny the appeal by giving a full expla-
nation of why the appeal could not be allowed, namely, because the
case could not stand on its merits. This way, Board members felt
that it would not be seen as denying VA benefits on a technicality.
For a time, the court tended to tolerate such approaches.
Today, one of the ways to overcome the effect of a prior final de-
nial is to present "new and material evidence" in order to reopen
the claim." In Manio v. Derwinski,'7 the court mandated a two-step
analysis when an attempt to reopen the claim with additional evi-
dence was made subsequent to a final denial. First, the Board must
determine whether the additional evidence is "new and material."
Second, if the Board determines that the claimant has produced
new and material evidence, then the claim is reopened and the case
evaluated on the basis of all the evidence, both old and new.' 8 In its
initial application of this two-step analysis, the court sustained
Board decisions that, in its opinion, could stand on their own merits
even though analysis contained in those decisions had not gone
through the proper procedural steps. 9 This changed with McGinnis
v. Brown:50
Upon further reflection, however, it becomes apparent that our
past analyses may have been incomplete; jurisdiction does indeed
matter and it is not "harmless" when the VA during the claims
adjudication process fails to address threshold jurisdictional issues.
This is particularly true when the Secretary ignores the mandates
45. Administrative denials of VA benefits to a claimant become final in one of two
ways: either an appeal is not filed within the time permitted by law, or there is a prior
Board decision on the same issue and a motion for reconsideration has not been re-
ceived or granted. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7103(a), 7104(b), 7105, 7105A (Supp. III 1991); 38
C.F.R. §§ 20.302, 20.501, 20.1100 (1992).
46. See 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (Supp. I1 1991).
47. 1 Vet. App. 140 (1991).
48. Id. at 145.
49. For an exposition and history of this harmless error approach, see Judge
Steinberg's separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in McGinnis v.
Brown, 4 Vet. App. 239, 245 (1993).
50. Id. at 239.
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of 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 7104(b) and 7105(c) (West 1991) which provide
that finally denied claims cannot be reopened without the submis-
sion of "new and material evidence" under 38 U.S.C.A- § 5108 in
the case of final BVA decisions or without compliance with regula-
tions in the case of unappealed final RO [Regional Office] denials.
When we affirm a BVA decision which purports to deny a reopened
claim on the merits after we have concluded that there was, in fact
and in law, no reopened claim to deny, we give at best equivocal
direction to adjudicators and members of the Board, deprive the
previous denial of finality, and effectively establish a date for a new
final denial which has no basis in fact or in law. We conclude that
the appropriate remedy in such circumstances is not to affirm the
BVA decision denying the claim on the merits but to vacate the
decision and thereby reestablish the finality of the previous
denial.51
Although it is hard to quarrel with the court's position on purely
legal grounds, the point is clear that the Board now must give full
credence to the technical requirements of the law--especially in
matters affecting its own jurisdiction.
JUSTICE DELAYED
The court has been creating a body of "veterans' common lav'
through its precedent decisions . 2 The applicable law, as articulated
by the decisions of the court, is changing on almost a daily basis.
Because of the increasing complexity and rapidly evolving state of
the law, BVA decisions are lengthier, more complex, and require
more time to prepare than ever before. As a consequence, speedy
justice in VA claims adjudication has become an elusive target. No
decision of the court has yet resulted in an improvement in decision
productivity or timeliness anywhere in the entire VA adjudication
system.5 3 Many decisions have had the exact opposite result. Fur-
thermore, another layer of appellate review adds to processing time
as lower level adjudicatory bodies struggle to meet new require-
ments. The remainder of this section looks at some of the complica-
tions that have served to lengthen VA's claims adjudication process.
Providing benefits to this country's veterans is an enormous un-
dertaking. The fiscal year 1992 VA entitlement appropriations to-
taled more than seventeen billion dollars.5 VA pays out more than
51. Id. at 244.
52. En banc and panel decisions of the court are precedentiaL Single judge deci-
sions are essentially only "law of the case." See Bethea v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 252,
254 (1992).
53. CHAmn's ANN. REP. (1992), supra note 21, at 15. It is possible that some
subsequent decisions by the court placing greater emphasis on terminating review at
earlier stages in appropriate cases, such as McGinnis, will eventually have an impact
on expediting some cases.
54. SECRETARY's ANN. REP. (1992), supra note 30, at 63.
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eight hundred million dollars in disability benefit payments every
month.55 VA regional offices around the country accomplished 3.2
million "completed actions" in fiscal year 1992.56 Notices of disa-
greement, the first procedural step in appealing an adverse field de-
termination, 7 filed in the field during fiscal year 1992 totaled 69,928.
During the same period, 38,229 appeals were pursued to completion
and transferred to the Board. The Board disposed of 33,483 cases.
About half of those dispositions were final decisions by the Board
appealable to the court. The court received 1,742 notices of appeal
during the fiscal year. Only a tiny fraction of the adjudicative deci-
sions made in the field and only about 10% of the Board's final deci-
sions wind up before the court.58 Nevertheless, the impact of the
court's decisions is enormous because they often dramatically
change procedures throughout the system.
The court has held that its decisions must be given full force and
effect immediately, even when VA may have appealed a decision.50
The precedent panel or en banc decisions of the court, announcing
important changes in interpretation of the law, affect each of the
thousands of cases pending at any given time and may require re-
turning to "square one" with all affected cases. Occasionally, the
process must be repeated twice in the same case when the court
reverses itself on further review.60 This offshoot of judicial review
often adds to claim processing time."
55. Id. at 81.
56. Telephone interview by a member of my staff with Michael Bratz, Field Oper-
ations Staff Chief, Field Operations Division, Veterans Benefits Administration, De-
partment of Veterans Affairs (July 15, 1993). Mr. Bratz indicated that this figure
includes adjudications of all types of compensation and pension claims processed by
VA's various regional offices. It does not include all potentially appealable field deci-
sions. For example, it does not include decisions made in education benefit claims.
The figure does, however, illustrate the scope of VA's adjudicative activity and the
very small number of determinations appealed.
57. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (Supp. II 1991).
58. See UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS APPEALS, CASEFLOW REPORT (Mar. 31,
1993).
59. Tobler v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 8, 14 (1991). The c6urt did provide VA with
some latitude in terms of staying cases pending the outcome of an appeal from one of
its decisions. Id. at 12 (citing Ithaca College v. N.L.R.B., 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980)). 38 U.S.C. § 7267 (formerly § 4067) origi-
nally permitted some reaction time by providing, in effect, that the court's decisions
did not become final for 30 days. That provision was later deleted. Pub. L. No. 102-
82, § 1, 105 Stat. 375 (1991).
60. For example, in "Abernathy I," published at 2 Vet. App. 391 (1992), but later
withdrawn from publication, the court held that the Board should apply the Manio
two-step analysis to pension claims. Several months later, in "Abernathy II," the
court retreated from this position on reconsideration. Abernathy v. Principi, 3 Vet.
App. 461, 464 (1992).
61. While there has been appellate review of VA claims adjudication in the field
for 60 years by the Board itself, the Board's decisions are not precedential. See 38
C.F.R. § 20.1303 (1992). Accordingly, they did not have the same impact within the
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Another factor that significantly increases the time it takes for fi-
nal resolution of a claim is that the Board is finding that it must
remand more cases for additional development than it has in the
past. Most cases remanded to the originating agency are returned to
the Board for final adjudication. For the decade prior to the passage
of the VJRA, the Board's fiscal year remand rates ran from a low of
13.4% to a high of 20.7%. With the full impact of judicial review,
the remand rate hit 50.5% in fiscal year 1992. The rate for the first
three quarters of fiscal year 1993 is only slightly improved, at
47.3%.62
Several factors contribute to this increase, but the most significant
has been the court's expansive interpretation of the Department's
duty to assist claimants in the development of their claims.0 3 Vari-
ous decisions of the court require VA to seek out potentially rele-
vant additional service records," private and VA medical records,"
Social Security Administration records,66 new physical examina-
tions,67 and more complete examinations.68 Other decisions have ex-
panded the scope of appeals, under the duty to assist rubric, to in-
clude "inferred" claims for ancillary benefits 0 and "issues raised in
all documents or oral testimony submitted prior to the BVA deci-
sion," even though those issues may not have been mentioned at all
in an appellant's formal appeal.7
0
"Due process" remands by the Board have also increased and are
likely to continue to increase. The court's tendency to expand the
scope of issues on appeal, making it more likely that an issue will
have been missed and therefore not adjudicated below, has already
been noted. The court has also been extremely expansive about
what statutory and regulatory authorities must be addressed. For
example, in Schafrath v. Derwinski,71 the court stated, "Where a
VA regulation is made potentially applicable through the assertions
Department.
62. Internal Records of the Board (on file with author).
63. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (Supp. 111 1991).
64. See, e.g., Jolley v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 37 (1990).
65. See, e.g., Case v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 592, 595 (1992); Schafrath v. Derwin-
ski, 1 Vet. App. 589, 593 (1991); Ferraro v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 326, 334 (1991);
Littke v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 90, 92 (1990).
66. See, e.g., Murincsak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 363, 372 (1992).
67. See, e.g., Proscelle v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 629, 632 (1992).
68. See, e.g., Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16, 21 (1991); Schafrath v. Derwin-
ski, 1 Vet. App. 589, 595 (1991); Moore v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 401, 405-06 (1991);
Littke v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 90, 92-93 (1990).
69. Akies v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 118, 121 (1991).
70. EF v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 324, 326 (1991). Interestingly, opinions such as
this one neither note nor discuss statutory provisions that suggest that an appellant
has at least some obligation to be clear about what he or she is seeking on appeal.
See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 7105(d)(3), 7105(d)(5) (Supp. II 1991).
71. 1 Vet. App. 589 (1991).
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and issues raised in the record, the Board's refusal to acknowledge
and consider that regulation is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion,' and 'not in accordance with the law,' and must be set
aside as such. '7 2 Thus, the Board will need to identify and discuss
all potentially applicable statutes and regulations even if they have
not been raised or specifically considered below. In Bernard v.
Brown,3 the court stated:
[W]hen, as here, the Board addresses in its decision a question that
had not been addressed by the RO [Regional Office], it must con-
sider whether the claimant has been given adequate notice of the
need to submit evidence or argument on that question and an op-
portunity to submit such evidence and argument and to address
that question at a hearing, and, if not, whether the claimant has
been prejudiced thereby. 4
A Board section's decision to remand a case to the field is not
necessarily a reflection on the work product of various VA field of-
fices. There may be a substantial interval between the time that a
decision is made in the field and the time that decision is reviewed
by the Board-an interval that is unfortunately growing longer in
the current climate. As the recent past has proved, the state of vet-
erans law can change rapidly. What was accepted practice when a
field decision was made may no longer be legal when the Board re-
views the decision.
Another case that significantly extends the time involved in reach-
ing a final decision is Thurber v. Brown.7 5 The evolution of the
court's reasoning began earlier with its decision in Colvin v. Derwin-
ski.76 The Colvin court concluded that the Board could only con-
sider independent medical evidence and could not rely on the medi-
cal judgment of its members. 7 Often the medical evidence received
by the Board does not include a reasoned, well-supported opinion
about the main medical question at issue although the raw data
upon which to base such an opinion is present. The court seemed to
realize this difficulty in Colvin where it stated:
If the medical evidence of record is, insufficient, or, in the opinion
of the BVA, of doubtful weight or credibility, the BVA is always
free to supplement the record by seeking an advisory opinion, or-
72. Id. at 593 (emphasis added).
73. 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993).
74. Id. at 394.
75. 5 Vet. App. 119 (1993).
76. 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991). As to advisory medical opinions, see 38 U.S.C. § 7109
(Supp. III 1991). In a later case, the court required that, prospectively, the Board
"include in its decisions quotations from medical treatises (rather than bare cita-
tions), and such quotations should be of sufficient length so that their context (both
within the treatise in question and within the body of relevant medical literature) is
able to be determined." Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 213, 217 (1992).
77. Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 172.
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dering a medical examination or citing recognized medical treatises
in its decisions that clearly support its ultimate conclusions."
Reliance on medical treatises is an attractive alternative in rou-
tine cases, although it can sometimes be extremely difficult to find
an authority for very basic principles. The Board implemented this
method in a number of cases, including Thurber v. Brown.
In Thurber, the court addressed for the first time the due process
implications of using evidence, in this case medical texts, that had
not been part of the record below and that the appellant had not
had an opportunity to rebut. The court held:
[B]efore the BVA relies, in rendering a decision on a claim, on any
evidence developed or obtained by it subsequent to the issuance of
the most recent SOC or SSOC with respect to such claim, the BVA
must provide a claimant with reasonable notice of such evidence
and of the reliance proposed to be placed on it, and a reasonable
opportunity for the claimant to respond to it If, in the course of
developing or obtaining or attempting to so develop or obtain such
evidence, the BVA becomes aware of any evidence favorable to the
claimant, it shall provide the claimant with reasonable notice of
and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the favorable evidence,
and shall in its decision provide reasons or bases for its findings
with respect to that evidence.70
Compliance with Thurber will add at least sixty to ninety additional
days to the processing of cases affected by that decision. 0
Board decisions now simply take a great deal more time to pre-
pare and review because of their increased complexity." The rela-
tively simple, result-oriented decisions of the past are not adequate
to meet the court's requirements. The old standard used by the
Board for planning purposes in estimating resource requirements
was that an average Board decision was 240 typed lines, or about six
78. Id. at 175.
79. Thurber v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 119, 126 (1993). "SOC" and "SSOC" refer to
"statement of the case" and "supplemental statement of the case." See 38 US.C.
§ 7105(d)(1) (Supp. 1I 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.29-19.31 (1992).
80. I have exercised my authority under 38 C.F.R. § 20.2 (1992) to prescribe a
procedure to meet the court's Thurber requirements. This procedure will provide no-
tice and comment opportunities similar to those provided by 38 C.F.R. § 20.903
(1992) when the Board intends to rely on medical treatises or other evidence gathered
following the most recent statement of the case or supplemental statement of the
case. BOARn OF VErERANS' APPEALS. US. D eARTaunr OF Vnm'uN~s AFFAIRS. mA o-
RAsNuhs No. 01-93-12. PROCESSING OF APPEALS AFFECTED BY THtRRER V. BnoWN. No.
92-172 (U.S. Vwr. Anp. MAY 14. 1993).
81. The trend toward increased complexity may be illustrated by the growth of
the chapter of the BVA manual that outlines the basics of preparation of Board deci-
sions. VA, Board of Veterans' Appeals, MBVA-1, pt. If, ch. 9. When the chapter was
formally revised and reprinted in 1986, it was 28 pages in length, including the exhib-
its. The first draft of a new revision currently under review is 139 pages in length,
including exhibits.
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pages, in length. Average decision length in fiscal year 1993 has been
300 lines. Even this 25% increase does not tell the full story. About
half of the Board's decisions are now remands. These are not final
decisions and the remand documents are typically much shorter
than decisions on the merits. The average cost per decision has in-
creased dramatically, more than doubling from fiscal year 1988 to
date. This increase reflects the time it takes to perform the detailed
research and prepare the lengthy explanations that are now required
in even relatively simple cases. The Board's heavy work load has
been subject to judicial notice by the court in a recent decision
which noted: "The Court judicially notes that the Board has an ex-
tremely heavy work load and is striving very hard to meet new re-
quirements that are, in part, due to cases from this Court."82
Compliance with the requirements of the evolving "veterans' com-
mon law" has caused the Board to fall further behind as it attempts
to do more with limited resources, including the current statutory
limitation on the number of Board members.8 The new complexity
has had a similar effect throughout the VA claims adjudication sys-
tem. Appeal processing time in the field averaged 168 days in fiscal
year 1988. For the first three quarters of fiscal year 1993, it was 213
days. The time it took to process an average appeal to completion at
the Board was 136 days in fiscal year 1988. It is now 238 days. In
fiscal year 1988, the Board received 43,792 appeals and disposed of
41,607 appeals. In fiscal year 1992, the figures were 38,229 and
33,483, respectively. The Board received 27,610 appeals during the
first three quarters of fiscal year 1993, but was only able to dispose
of 20,088. Another way of looking at the situation is to measure "re-
sponse time," the projected number of days it would take the Board
to decide all currently pending appeals based on the average number
of decisions rendered per day over the preceding year. Response
time increased from 139 days in fiscal year 1991 to 240 days in fiscal
year 1992. In August 1993, that figure reached an all-time high of
405 days and is projected to go as high as 441 days by the end of
this fiscal year.
8 4
In a memorandum of June 8, 1993, the Secretary of Veterans Af-
fairs instructed the Board to include in or attach to each of its final
decisions entered on or after October 1, 1993, a list of the specific
evidence that the Board relied on in arriving at its decision. This
"Certified List" will include all items of substantive evidence, as
well as evidence covering all procedural and "duty to assist" issues,
which were considered by the Board. The list will be presented by
VA General Counsel to the court for consideration as the "desig-
nated record" in each case on appeal. At this point, the Board is
82. Delisio v. Brown, No. 93-639 (U.S. Vet. Ct. App. July 15, 1993).
83. 38 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (Supp. HI 1991).
84. Internal Records of the Board (on file with author).
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unable to quantify the effect of the preparation of the "Certified
List" on the productivity and timeliness of decisions. Clearly, it will
not have a salutary effect on either.
MEETING THE CHALLENGE
Simpler times are unlikely to return. In the meantime, the Board
is doing its best to meet the challenges. Board decision formats have
been completely redesigned to meet the court's requirements. We
are promptly distributing the court's decisions to Board members
and staff counsel. Revised procedures are devised as rapidly as pos-
sible to meet changing needs when new interpretations of the law
are received. VA has allocated funds to increase our staff of attor-
neys to assist with decision preparation, as wel as to implement
computer automation plans. The Board should be fully automated,
using state-of-the-art computer technology, in the coming fiscal
year. In July of this year, we used new technology to archive one
year's BVA decisions on a single CD-ROM disc, permitting exhaus-
tive data searches with sophisticated software. A formal, compre-
hensive training program for staff counsel has been initiated. Board
employees, who were previously in several locations within the Dis-
trict of Columbia, have been consolidated into one building to im-
prove communications and case movement logistics. Effective in
January 1992, I exercised my authority to direct that Board hearings
be conducted by single members of the Board, rather than panels of
members, in order to provide hearings more rapidly and to free
members for other duties."5 The Board held 1,394 hearings in Wash-
ington, D.C., and 1,258 hearings at VA's regional offices in fiscal year
1992, a significant increase from the 1,108 hearings held in Washing-
ton, D.C., and the 880 hearings held in VA regional offices in fiscal
year 1991.86 In fiscal year 1993, the Board held 3,533 hearings at VA
regional offices and 1,172 hearings in Washington, D.C.81 I have in-
troduced "trailing docket" procedures to maximize the effective use
of Board members' time in conducting hearings. Measures such as
these are especially important in view of the increased work load in
general and the increase in the number of field hearing requests
since the right to a hearing in the field became statutory with the
passage of the VJRA.8 8 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that improve-
ments in administrative efficiency alone will be able to restore ap-
peal resolution to the previous levels of response time.
The United States Senate is currently considering the Depart-
ment's legislative proposal in the form of a bill known as the "Veter-
85. See 38 U.S.C. § 7102(b) (Supp. 11 1991).
86. CHrtamm's ANN. REP. (1992), supra note 21, at 9.
87. Internal Records of the Board (on file with author).
88. See 38 U.S.C. § 7110 (Supp. M 1991). As of April 1993, there were 2,611
pending requests for field hearings before Board members.
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ans' Appeals Improvement Act of 1993,"89 to improve and clarify
certain adjudication and appeal procedures relating to claims for
benefits. This legislative proposal would help to alleviate the case
backlog. One of the changes contained in this bill is a provision that
would permit individual Board members to decide cases, as opposed
to the current system of review by three-member Board sections. 0
It is projected that this would permit an approximate 25% overall
increase in decision productivity. Decision making by individual ad-
ministrative law judges has worked well in the Social Security Ad-
ministration and other administrative appeals systems. Using those
systems as a model, review by individual Board members could be
effective here as well.
In addition, the bill would permit the Board to conduct at least
some hearings with the presiding Board member or members re-
maining in Washington and taking testimony of appellants and wit-
nesses in the field through the use of modern communications tech-
nology. This should cut down on productive time lost during travel
and permit the Board to offer hearings more promptly.
Under the bill, the Chairman, or another single Board member,
would also be able to rule on procedural motions and other matters
not requiring extensive familiarity with all of the evidence in a case.
This could permit streamlined motion disposition procedures that
would free other members to review and decide cases on the merits.
The bill would permit more flexibility to meet case load needs by
removing the current statutory ceiling on the total number of Board
members. Another feature would be a provision specifically author-
izing the Board to utilize medical experts employed by VA and
other government agencies to help meet the demand for medical
opinions generated by the Colvin decision-authority already im-
plied by 38 U.S.C. § 7109.
SUMMARY
Judicial review is achieving some of its intended results. It has
provided a convenient forum for testing the validity of VA regula-
tions, settling some long-disputed points of veterans law. It has
helped in establishing a more systematic approach to benefit claims
adjudication. By providing a forum for dispute resolution outside
the Department, it has enhanced the perception of fairness and ob-
jectivity in the adjudication process. It is noteworthy that the
Board's allowance rate (reversal of decisions of VA regional offices)
has increased from a range of 12.8% to 14.4% between fiscal year
1982 and fiscal year 1991, to 15.8% in fiscal year 1992 and 16.2% for
fiscal year 1993 through July 30, 1993. Some of the feared results,
89. S. 1445, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
90. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7102(a)(1), 7103(a) (Supp. III 1991).
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such as a nonadversarial system being overwhelmed by attorney-in-
duced contentiousness and complexity, have not come to pass.
Nevertheless, there have been offsets in the form of requirements
for extensive, costly, and time-consuming record building; more
bluntness, formality, and an ensuing adversarial tone in decisional
documents; and new legal and procedural complexity that considera-
bly lengthens claims resolution at the administrative level. In fact,
average response time now has increased to more than threefold
from what historically had been considered "timely." Only partial
relief can be attained by improvements in administrative efficiency
at the Board. Some legislative initiatives, particularly permitting ap-
pellate decisions by individual Board members rather than panels of
members, may provide additional relief.

